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      Minilateralism Matters: 
 An Analysis of Japan's Diplomacy on Global Warming1)
Hidekazu Sakai
Abstract 
The global warming is a transnational issue by definition that no single country cannot 
effectively solve by itself. However, it has been ironically proved that it has been facing 
enormous difficulty to architect the global cooperative system meeting the challenge 
because it is transnational issue. This paper employs the concept of multilateralism crafted 
by John Gerald Ruggie to illustrate the current status of the global warming politics because 
global warming is too obviously collective good and cannot be a zero-sum issue. This paper 
assumes that complete cooperation is ultimately inevitable, but also purports to analyze 
current international cooperation by using Ruggie's concept of multilateralism that has shed 
lights on "nature of cooperation" rather than liberal institutionalism emphasizing organiza-
tional or norm structures. However, this paper then argues that his argument is still ineffec-
tive, and, therefore, this paper also utilizes the concept of minilateralism of Miles Kahler as 
auxiliary. In so doing, this paper can explain the status of "divided multilateralism" of 
global warming from the 1990s onwards. 
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    Introduction 
 Global warming is a transnational issue; by definition, no one country can tackle it alone, 
therefore a multilateral approach is essential. It is ironic, however that there have been enor-
mous difficulties in constructing a multilateral governance approach to global warming pre-
cisely because it is a transnational issue. This is far from an isolated case, as can be seen in 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) talks over the last few decades. Indeed, in terms 
of this problem, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
and the NPT are quite similar. 
 The UNFCCC emerged out of the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED) that took place in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. This was a highly political 
meeting, in which a new North-South conflict and serious discrepancies among the viewpoints
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 of advanced industrial states emerged. They clashed over the nature of the division of CO2 
emission reductions responsibility. The fundamental nature of this conflict over global warm-
ing has remained unchanged since then. Today, the primary arena where all the signatory 
states of the UNFCCC discuss the division of responsibility is the Conference of the Parties 
(COP). The COP has been held annually since COP 1 was held in Berlin in 1995, and has often 
been faced with critical situations. These include COP 3 in Kyoto in 1997 and COP 6 part II, 
which was held in Bonn in 2001, which came close to destroying the UNFCCC itself. 
However, signatory states somehow managed to conduct heir negotiations and they ultimately 
arrived at the several compromises that saved the multilateral framework approach to global 
warming. 
 This willingness to compromise may well be due to the very real danger that global warming 
poses. In the Cold War era, environmental issues were regarded as "low politics" by national 
leaders while strategic-military issues were regarded as "high politics." However, today's 
international political players have blurred the boundaries between these two issues. Indeed, 
environment destruction has become an increasingly important security matter since the 
1970s2). The prioritization of environmental issues has happened in particular as the threat of 
a nuclear war between the US and the Soviet Union has become increasingly unlikely. The 
collapse of this polarized system brought the confrontation of these two major political-military 
blocks to an end, thereby reducing the influential power of the US and the Soviet Union (later 
Russia) over their former allies. 
With the shift of security concerns from the nuclear wars to global warming, Japan's influ-
ence has become relatively more significant. Japan is one of the biggest CO2 releasing states 
besides the United States and the European Union. Japan's behavior is simply critical for CO2 
reduction in the global level. In terms of diplomacy, Japan's actions would also affect how the 
US and the EU would conduct their diplomacy on this issue. As referred later, North, namely 
Japan, the US and the EU, have been criticized by South, developing countries including 
China, for North's reckless industrial development for a few centuries that caused global warm-
ing at first. The success of anti-global warming measurement had been dependent upon how 
the three core actors would be able to coordinate their policies. In so doing, North can appeal 
their legitimacy on advancing anti-global warming diplomacy to South. 
 The question may then be posed, what kind of contribution has Japan made so far? What in-
ternational efforts have been made to maintain the system of global governance? In particular, 
what role has Japan played during the period of the implementation of Kyoto Protocol (KP) and 
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its development since the US defected from it in 2001? This paper analyzes Japan's diplomatic 
 approach to the issue of global warming, by focusing on COP 3 (1997) and COP 6 part II (2001) 
and by employing Ruggie's concept of multilateralism, and Miles Kahler's concept of 
minilateralism.
   Theoretical Problems 
Regime Theory 
 In most of the attempts that have assessed the influence of international governance on 
today's somewhat anarchical world, the concept of regime has often been utilized. Indeed, the 
Kyoto Protocol (KP) is often referred to as a global warming regime. According to Stephen 
Krasner, a regime can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and de-
cision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of inter-
national relations'. If we follow this definition, it is clear that the KP falls perfectly within 
these criteria. The aim of halting global warming is explicitly present, and various institution-
alized mechanisms, procedures, and even a compliance system have been built around it. 
 However, if we are trying to assess the nature of a particular regime, then we will need to 
identify its content. This means that we must know how each state confronts the realities of 
each specific policy, and how they interact with other member states within the regime.
Multilateralism 
 To illustrate the nature of cooperation, John Ruggie's concept of "multilateralism" is useful. 
Multilateralism is frequently used as a concept that is contrary to either bilateralism or 
unilateralism. Multilateralism denotes relations among three or more parities while 
bilateralism concerns relations between two states, and unilateralism represents a sole state's 
foreign affairs. Indeed, Robert Keohane defines multilateralism as "the practice of coordinat-
ing national policies in groups of three or more states.74' Ruggie has criticized this notion and, 
instead, has proposed that while the numerical feature is a necessary condition for 
multilateralism, it is not a sufficient condition for multilateralism. The sufficient conditions 
are concerned with the principles on the basis of which the relations among states are 
organized'. A multilateral world order would include rules of conduct that can equally apply 
to all states, as opposed to discriminating against some due to situational constraints and par-
ticularistic preferences.6) Ruggie goes even further and suggests that such an order would also 
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allow for a greater degree of indivisibility among the interests of different countries than other 
forms of governance. This might generate two possible effects. One is that there is a greater 
incentive to promote interests through collective action. The other possible effect is that each 
state is then permitted to engage in international transactions from which they may then calcu-
late their gains and losses. These effects are the opposite to those that emerge on the back of 
 case-by-case bilateral reciprocity.7) 
Ruggie's then argues that there can be international regimes having non-multilateral charac-
teristics. For example, Nazi Germany's international trade system in the 1930s — the so-called 
Schacht Plan — was not a multilateral regime because it was based on bilateral agreements and 
clearing arrangements.8' Another example of a non multilateral regime Comintern (later 
Cominform) that was a regime based explicitly on the principle of Marxism-Leninism.' On the 
other hand, Ruggie points out that there have been multilateral international frameworks that 
did not fulfill the criteria for a regime, according to Krasner's theory. These frameworks in-
clude the Concert of Europe and the British free trade system.10' The aspects that make a re-
gime multilateral are that behavior among three or more states is coordinated on the basis of 
generalized principles of conduct.11' In addition, Ruggie stresses the quality of the actors 
within each regime or international system.
Minilateralism 
 Theoretically speaking, it seems very likely that, as the number of involved actors increases, 
cooperation among them becomes more difficult to attain. Kenneth Oye notes that, as the 
number of participants increases, the feasibility of sanctioning declines, recognition and con-
trol problems occur, and the ability to identity common interests is also reduced.' Indeed, the 
empirical evidence demonstrates that multilateral regimes have not always been conducted in 
the multilateral mode that Ruggie depicts. Some cases have revealed that great power collabo-
rations appear to generate or sustain multilateral regimes, as can be seen in the cases of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). 
 According to Barry Eichengreen's historical survey, the international monetary regime since 
the nineteenth century has demonstrated the same pattern of collaboration among the great 
powers. The international monetary system has always been regarded as having come into ex-
isting "after hegemony," in the sense that more than a single dominant economic power was re-
quired to ensure the provision and maintenance of international monetary stability.13' The US 
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also demonstrated little intention to carry out a downright campaign against the many remain-
ing discriminatory exchange relationships during the first decade after 1945. Only after the 
 mid-1950s did the IMF initiate a major attack on the four hundred bilateral exchange agree-
ments.14' 
 In the trade regime that is run according to the multilateral principle manifested in the 
GATT, there have also been collaborations of great powers that limited the multilateral princi-
ple. In the immediate postwar world, particularly among great powers, bilateralism was still 
a predominant exchange mode. The Kennedy Round soon proved the difficulty of persuading 
the multilateral nations that were most favored by the US to engage in bargaining practice. 
Quickly, the only modes of negotiation that remained practical when negotiations were being 
conducted between the principal supplier of a product and its major importing nations were bi-
lateral arrangements, or the collaboration of several powerful states. The negotiating group of 
key countries during the Kennedy administration was called the "bridge club.i15' Concessions 
that were negotiated among the dominant traders were then extended to other participants. 
Multilateral trade negotiations became a substantial, large, and complicated series of bilateral 
negotiations. The main actions of each negotiation took place away from multilateral meet-
ings. The great power hierarchy that emerged during the Kennedy Round became quite well-
established during the next Tokyo Round. Gilbert Winham describes this in terms of the 
emergence of a pyramidal structure, where agreements were initiated by the major powers at 
the top, and they became gradually multilateralized as other countries were gradually included 
in the discussions.16' 
 These diplomatic behaviors are part of the "gray area" that exists in multilateralism. The 
formation of groups of key negotiating states is sometimes an effective means to further nego-
tiations in a multilateral setting. This is because this situation allows for conflicting points to 
be discussed and makes concessions more attainable. As we have discussed above, multilat-
eral regimes have sometimes been governed by cooperative structures of powerful states. 
Miles Khaler calls this minilateralism. The US uses minilateralism as a means to govern inter-
national regimes in those situations where other principal economic powers were deemed to be 
taking advantage of the system and were regarded as unacceptable, situations where addi-
tional legislation was required, and situations where exclusion or the threat of exclusion from 
the regimes was undesirable. The cost of minilateral collaboration to the US was the imple-
mentation of an institutional structure that placed some limitations on the unilateral actions of 
America and reduced the benefits that America got from cooperation.'' 
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 To summarize, minilateralism represents the collaborative diplomatic actions of powerful 
states in multilateral regimes. Through its implementation, unilateralism (predominantly 
American) is somehow limited by other powerful states. However, negotiations towards mul-
tilateral agreements can be more effectively made. In this sense, minilateralism is not only de-
rived from multilateralism but also is also a useful means to resolve deadlocked international 
negotiations within the wider multilateral framework.
       Why focus on Japan's role in the COP 3 and COP 6 part II? 
 This paper will examine Japan's role in minilateral framework. The reason for this focus is 
 twofold. First, Japan is a state that is responsible for major CO2  emissions. Japan is recog-
nized as one of the key states that are responsible for halting global warming, together with the 
EU and the US. Their trilateral cooperation is crucially important if CO2 emissions are to be 
reduced at the global level. Second, Japan is very concerned with issues of environmental pro-
tection, and has many technologies available to help implement his protection. Japan has had 
a history of environmental concern that reaches back to the mid-1950s. This concern was 
prompted by the tragedies of mercury and cadmium poisoning that occurred in Yokkaichi and 
Minamata — the so-called Kogai — that became controversial social issues and had a significant 
impact on policy-makers and prompted suggestions for alternative business practices. The 
1970s oil shock also provided a stimulus for Japan to become energy conscious, as it recog-
nized its energy vulnerability.' 
 Why focus on COP 3 and COP 6 part II? Both conferences provided critical instances where 
the EU, Japan, and the US were locked into a conflict that might have destroyed the multilat-
eral framework. Japan was in a critical diplomatic position in these negotiations. As the COP 
3 hosting state, it is highly likely that Japan could not help but assume the role of conflict-
resolver among them. In COP 6 part II, Japan was put in a more critical situation when the US 
officially announced its defection from the KP. If Japan and the EU had failed to agree, then 
the KP itself would have ceased to be effective. It is natural to assume that Japan took major 
initiatives in order to be in accord with the EU. In short, both conferences provided instances 
where the multilateral framework approach to the issue of global warming was saved from de-
struction largely because of Japan's minilateral efforts.
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                  Japan's Global Warming Diplomacy 
Before COP 3 
 Global warming soon began to be part of the wider new North-South issue. Many develop-
ing countries, together with China, formed the "Group of 77 plus China (G77 + C)"19)  in the 
1980s in order to further their position that global warming was entirely attributed to the reck-
less development by the North (the US, the EU, and Japan). G77 + C soon became a negotiator 
with the EU, Japan and the US.20' 
 The UNCED in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 marked the first global summit meeting on global en-
vironmental issues that was hosted by a nation in the South; it came to symbolize the genuine 
need for multilateral cooperation. The Japanese government could not take diplomatic initia-
tives at the UNCED in Rio de Janeiro 1992. This was due partly to the fact that Japan was 
faced with a stormy political situation regarding Japanese forces' participation in the United 
Nations' peacekeeping Operations for the first time. Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa was un-
able to attend the UNCED, and Japan was the only country from the industrialized nations that 
did not send a national leader. Furthermore, Japan had proposed an increase of 50 percent for 
the environmental protection budget within its Official Development Assistance (ODA). 
However, since the adjustment of the conflicting views of the ministries concerned took an 
enormous amount of time, Japan was not able to present he new ODA plans in the early phase 
of the Summit. Indeed, former foreign minister Saburo Okita, who had laid the groundwork 
for the wise-men meeting,21' expressed his regret that he was unable to present Japan's proac-
tive position towards the environment.22) 
 With the establishment of the UNFCCC in 1994, the next step of signatory states was to 
enact the principle of common but different responsibilities that had been outlined at the 
UNFCCC. The Conference of the Parties 1 (COP 1) was held in Berlin in 1995 precisely to dis-
cuss this implementation. The main focus of the COP 1 was to elaborate the meaning of this 
principle. The North was already divided into two major camps by the time of this meeting. 
On the one hand, the EU was proposing drastic CO2 reductions as its ultimate goal, and pro-
posing that individual annual targets be included in the protocol of the COP 3 of 1997. On the 
other hand, there was a group of non-EU developed countries, JUSSCANNZ23', namely Japan, 
the US, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Norway, and New Zealand, shared a more moderate 
position, and were opposed to the clear stipulation of reduction targets, and were in favor of 
the South's voluntary reduction of CO2 emissions. 
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 The COP 1 faced enormous disruption; much of the conference proceeded with all-night ne-
gotiating sessions, which went nowhere. At the heart of this disparity lay a difference in the 
way in which common but different responsibilities were interpreted. The savior of the frame-
work was the "green paper" that was submitted by the primary developing countries except 
those who were members of OPEC. This paper demanded unilateral concession from the 
North, without which developing countries would assume any further duties, and that the sig-
natory countries who initiated the protocol stipulate developed countries' duties. This became 
the foundation document hat lay behind the Berlin Mandate (BM). The Berlin Mandate out-
lines the protocol that requires developed countries to set reduction targets in terms of green-
house gas, and implement green policies, and mechanisms by 1997 in order to reduce the gross 
 amount of CO2  emission for the year 2000 to the levels of the year 1990. The unilateral char-
acteristics of the mandate resulted in huge indignation from developed nations, in particular 
the US. This became apparent in COP 6 part II (this will be discussed later). 
Between the COP 1 and COP 3 (the 1997 Kyoto Conference), there were a number of confer-
ences held. The COP 2, G8 summit meetings, and several meetings of the Ad Hoc Group for 
the Berlin Mandate (AGBM) were held in order to prepare for the 1997 Kyoto Conference. 
Negotiations after the COP 1 proceeded according to the targets outlined in the Mandate. This 
resulted in global warming politics entering a new phase. The fault line between the EU and 
the JUSSCAANS (in particular, the US) emerged over the interpretation of common and differ-
ent responsibilities, which had been a major fault line between North and South. The EU and 
the US clashed over each reduction target. 
 On the other hand, the EU and the US initiated a bizarre cooperative stance against the G 
77 + C.' At the AGBM 5 meeting in December 1996, the US and the EU demanded that the 
G 77 + C refute the unilateral aspects of the Berlin Mandate. The G77 + C responded to this de-
mand with a proposal emerging from a unified faction of AOSIS, G77 + C, and the OPEC at 
AGBM 8 in October 1997. This proposal suggested that the North was obligated to reduce 
their CO2 emission by 7.5 percent in 2005, 15 percent in 2010, and 35 percent in 2025. The 
proposal even included the establishment of a guarantee fund for the inevitable negative ef-
fects that this reduction would have on business. As a result, the actual reduction targets were 
not set until the COP 3. In this phase, the countries of the South successfully avoided CO 2 
emission regulation. On the other hand, they were gradually losing their influential power be-
cause, as they excluded themselves from the regulations, they were also excluded from the dis-
cussions.25'
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The COP 3: The Kyoto Conference 
 Japan hosted the COP 3 (the Kyoto Conference) in December 1997. The majority of the 
COP 3 was spent on meetings among the EU, the US, and Japan. The vast majority of those 
countries that made up the South merely waited for the compromises and consensus to be 
made. From the Japanese perspective the main aim for the COP 3 was threefold. First, the 
actual reduction targets must be set. Second, the target must be feasible for Japan to meet. 
 Finally, the US must join in agreement.26' While pursuing these aims, Japan did not intend to 
advocate future emission control of the South, since the revisit of the BM would complicate the 
COP 3 itself. As the host state, Japan wanted to avoid any breakdown of negotiations by bal-
ancing these aims. This was an extremely difficult task for Japan, and the only viable choice 
was to focus on the negotiations among Japan, the US and the EU that might enable the US 
to remain in the framework and adopt acceptable reduction targets. 
 The COP 3's success was dependent upon the last threedays of ministerial meetings that 
were conducted among Japan, the US and the EU. This was because the generation of the pro-
tocol setting reduction targets with numbers was the ultimate goal. Japan was determined to 
take the initiative and establish a great collaborative power union. Japanese Prime Minister 
Ryutaro Hashimoto made a speech demanding that developed countries must reduce their CO2 
emissions to one third of their current level.27' The US vice president Al Gore then addressed 
the crowd and outlined his proposal that achievable and binding numerical goals must be set. 
However, Gore revealed that he had received an order from President Clinton to take a more 
flexible approach.28' Japan, the US and the EU proceeded to conduct intensive percent-to-
percent negotiations. 
In the beginning of the COP 3, the US proposed a zero percent reduction while the EU ad-
vocated 15 percent. On the other hand, Japan was proposing a level of 5 percent. The trilat-
eral negotiations over numerical targets were incredibly intense.79' However, eventually they 
did generate the widely agreed reduction rates of 6 percent for Japan, 7 percent for the US, 
and 8 percent for the EU. 
 Now that there was agreement within the countries of the North, the Kyoto Protocol was 
adopted. While the Kyoto Protocol emerged as a product of negotiations among those coun-
tries that made up the North, the South only demonstrated its presence in COP 3 only when op-
posing any proposal by the North that demanded the South share responsibilities in the future. 
New Zealand proposed on the fifth day of the COP 3 the idea that developing countries must 
commit to their own emission regulations after 2014, and that the negotiations for this must be 
                                 97
Hidekazu Sakai
completed by 2002. The Phillipines' reaction to this was clear, "our response to this is, no, no, 
 and no." The G77 + C also vowed not to participate in any meetings on this matter, out of prin-
ciple. The South demonstrated their anger against the North attempts to share the burden be-
fore the North's numerical targets had been determined.30' In this sense, it can be said that, in 
some way, the protocol was generated out of deepened North-South decoupling.
COP 6 Part II: The Bonn Conference 
 After the US's official announcement of its defection from the KP in March 2001, COP 6 was 
resumed in Bonn, July 2001. The new administration of George W. Bush asserted that the KP 
was "fatally flawed." The Bush administration was concerned with the fact that 80 percent of 
the global population — including India and China — had not committed to reducing CO2 emis-
sion reductions and also that any CO2 reductions would harm the US economy.J1' During the 
period before COP part II, Japan — as the conference chair of the KP — actively attempted to 
convince the US to return to the KP. In April 22, the environment minister Junko Kawaguchi 
visited Washington DC after an informal ministerial meeting had prepared accords for COP 2 
Part II in New York, April 21. Kawaguchi met the economic adviser to President Linsey, 
Deputy Secretary of State Armitage, and Environment Protection Agency (EPA) 
Administrator Whiteman. She conveyed Japan's concern about the US defection from the KP 
and demanded that the US return to the KP. She presented both statesmen with the fact that 
both houses of the Japanese Diet had unanimously adopted a resolution that criticized the US 
defection.32' Prime Minister Koizumi met President Bush at the US-Japan summit meeting 
that was held at Camp David on June 30. Koizumi emphasized the importance of numerical re-
duction targets and the other mechanisms of the KP, and he proposed that there was still time 
for talks to be conducted on the KP between Japan and the US before the COP 6 part II. 
Koizumi then insisted that the world might be saved if only the countries would work closely 
together and create feasible measurements.' 
 The EU looked upon the efforts of the Japanese with dubiety; they were entirely pessimistic 
about possibilities of a US return, and made up their minds to generate accords on operational 
details so that the KP could be implemented promptly, without the US. The EU noted Japan 
's simultaneous attempt to avoid a delay of KP 6 part II and to persuade the US to return to 
the KP. During COP 6 part II Chairman Pronk even suggested that Japan's ambiguous posi-
tion endangered climate change policies.' 
 COP 6 part II began with Japan and the EU occupying totally different positions. Japan was 
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the subject of enormous attention in its role as a key state for ensuring the success of the meet-
ing. This was due to the fact that, unless Japan agreed, the conditions upon which the success 
 of the KP relies that all advanced industrial states agree to reduce their gross emissions of 
CO2 by 55 percent—would not be fulfilled. 
 In this negotiation, Japan took advantage of its critical position. Domestically, the Japanese 
government was under pressure from the business community to reduce the burden of CO2 
emission reductions by deploying the method of off-setting the balance of CO2 through the 
planting of forests to absorb the CO2, known as carbon sink projects. Although Japan was se-
verely criticized by other states and environment NGOs, Japan successfully attained a 3.9 per-
cent carbon offset through the sink project which achieved the gross reduction rate of 6 
percent, as had been stipulated in the KP.35' The main subject areas for debate were the Core 
Elements for the Implementation of the Buenos Aires Plan for Action (BAPA).J6' In particular, 
the G77 plus China, the EU, and the UG debated the nature of their compliance with the KP. 
After several ong nights of debate, it was decided that all stipulation regarding the financing 
covering any health damages caused by non-compliance with the KP would be deleted. Once 
Japan had consented to this agreement, the Core Elements for the Implementation of BAPA 
was approved. With this `Bonn Agreement," the KP was saved and the substantial 
operationalization of the KP was achieved. The Bonn Agreement became the foundation for 
the Marrakech Accords that came out of the following COP 7 in 2002, in which the fully com-
pleted operational details of the compliance system were outlined.
Analysis
 How can we understand Japanese diplomatic behaviors in COP 3 and COP 6 part II, in terms 
of multilateralism? It is safe to say that Japanese actions in COP 3 were minilateral. At COP 
3, cooperation among Japan, the EU, and the US was essential for the successful generation 
of the KP. Since the premises of the Berlin Mandate were outlined in COP 3, compromise 
among the major industrial powers was crucial. To this end, in its role as the host nation, 
Japan conducted intensive negotiations with the EU and the US in the final phase, and success-
fully achieved the outlining of numerical reduction targets. 
 During the COP 6 part II, Japan made efforts to encourage the US to join the KP. In this 
sense, Japan was seeking to implement minilateral consolidation with both the US and the EU, 
in order to save the KP in the initial phases. However, as the defection of the US seems 
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unchangeable, Japan exploited the critical situation to lighten its own emission reduction bur-
den. Although Japan's consent to compliance was critical in the final stage, Japan's exploitive 
actions were not merely expedient but also instrumental in defending multilateralism. 
Therefore, the Japanese were only partially exercising minilateralism in COP 6 Part II
Conclusion
 This paper analyzed Japanese diplomacy on global warming, focusing on COP 3 and COP 6 
 part II. Since the ideal type of multilateral diplomatic behavior as depicted by Ruggie is diffi-
cult to identify in many unusual cases especially in the case of global warming Kahler's con-
cept of minilateralism was introduced in an attempt to further illuminate Japan's diplomatic 
role. The FNCCC was generated in 1992, and the Berlin Mandate (BM) formed during COP 
1 was then adopted as the foundation for subsequent COPs. 
 However, the unilateral characteristics of the BM meant that the KP had several instances 
where it seemed very likely that major industrial powers would withdraw from it. The COP 
3 and COP 6 were typical cases. This paper attempts to illustrate Japan's diplomatic behavior 
at these meetings in order to assess whether Japan employed minilateral diplomatic behavior 
to save the multilateral framework. This paper concludes that Japan conducted its multilateral 
diplomacy in the way Khaler describes. However, the case of COP 3 demonstrates that 
Japan's behavior was based more on its hope that, as the host nation, it could ensure the con-
ference was a success. COP 6 Part II illustrated Japan's attempt o reduce its own burden that 
was stipulated at the KP. In this sense, a close examination of COP 6 Part II demonstrates 
that Japanese actions were only partially minilateral.
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